CHAPTER I: THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
CHAPTER III: GOOD AND THE “FUNDAMENTAL PARADOX OF
CHRISTIANITY”
CHAPTER IV: EVIL AND THE THEODICY
CHAPTER V: CAESAR’S – TO CAESAR
CHAPTER VIII: CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT
CHAPTER X: THE “IMMACULATE CONCEPTION”
Dr. Sergey Zagraevsky
NEW CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
The
original was published in Russian: ALEV-V Publishing House,
CHAPTER IV
EVIL AND THE THEODICY
I
The majority of philosophers considered the problem, which we are going
to discuss, as collateral and not so fundamental in comparison with the
problems of correlation between being and consciousness, of the cognoscibility
of the world etc. But in actual fact, without its solving a doubt is cast on
the existence of God, and together with it, on all that we have already
discussed – the existence of the moral imperative, Christianity, humanism...
The name to this problem was given by the work of Leibniz – “Theodicy”.
This word is translated from Latin as “the justification of God”, and its
essence is the following:
The moral imperative dictates us the faith in God as in the good, wise
and almighty power, which created the world. But how to explain that on the
Earth together with good there is evil, at that hardly at the less degree? Why
does God permit the existence of evil? Or of the devil, or of the Satan – it can
be called in any way.
Knowingly – then God is not good, furthermore, he is the source of evil?
Or God can not overcome evil – then he is not almighty, and the devil is
as strong as God?
And if the creation of the world as of the physical and moral whole
primordially assumed the presence of evil in it, then wouldn’t it have been
better for God not to create the world at all?
There were a great number of opinions on that. Let us start from the
most “materialistic” ones: Spinoza, Schopenhauer and Spenser with either
variations considered God as a morally indifferent power, and it seemed to be a
successful solution in the formal way, which we have already discussed: for God
(and, ultimately, for us) there is neither good nor evil.
The problem seems to be closed (together with the moral imperative), but
that is not so.
Let us cite a simple example. Walking along a meadow, we do not think
that at every step we break the grass and crush insects. And in the case of the
Theodicy of Spinoza and Schopenhauer, we, people, turn out to be in the role of
these insects. We, victims of ruthless nature, terrible
catastrophes and other large-scale manifestations of the “Divine Indifference”.
Consequently, the moral indifference of God becomes evil, and this comes
into a conflict with the initial prerequisite of Theodicy – we believe in God
as in a good power.
So let us consider the wrongfulness of such a method as one more
confirmation of the accuracy of our understanding of the moral imperative, and
let us turn to the second variant of the solution of the problem of the Theodocy – Dualism.
We shall have to examine it more comprehensively.
II
Some Early Christian religious and philosophic schools and a number of
contemporary to them Eastern religions (Gnosticism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrinism) solved the problem
of the Theodicy in the following way: good and evil, God and the devil are two
quite equivalent origins of the world.
This point of view seems effective and logical – it turns out that God
is not a culprit of evil, and that God is fighting for good with all his might,
though hitherto can not win. Two independent, non-interconnected and even
hostile gods appear – the first is good, the second is evil. That is Dualism.
And we shall try to prove the wrongfulness of the Dualistic point of
view by the “rule of contraries”.
The fact is that two practically equivalent powers turn out to be – God
and the devil. Consequently, every human may have the temptation to come to
an agreement with the devil.
For example, that was done by Faust in Goethe’s book.
The plot of “Faust” is well known. The treaty about the alliance with
the devil, the second youth of Faust, his tragic love to Gretchen (“organized”
by Mephistopheles), wandering to the Walpurgis-nights and witches’ sabbaths, helping to the emperor, the attempt to build an
“ideal” city, Faust’s death and his entering into heaven, though he had
“sullied” himself by the treaty with the devil.
All this is the outward side of the book. But there is a background,
important for us, and we must talk about it more attentively.
In each case Mephistopheles’ aim was to lead Faust astray of knowledge
and development, to make him “exalt the single moment”. Faust understood that,
but took the risk for the sake of prolongation of the active life, moreover
having the mighty assistant – the devil. And it seemed that he was victorious –
thanks to Mephistopheles, he prolonged his life, learnt many new things, and
entered into heaven in the end.
But let us remember, how serious and worthy of respect Faust is in the
beginning of the book, when during the walk he meets peasants and they thank
him for the selflessness in the time of an epidemics. And not only in that
episode – in the behavior of Faust and in all his words we see an outstanding
person with the independent thought and great strength of spirit.
And who did he become after the treaty with Mephistopheles?
Already in the first part of the book, it seems that Faust does not know, what to do with the second life, which he had suddenly
got. Mephistopheles “gives” him the unlucky virgin Gretchen to make him “exalt
the single moment”. Love did not make Faust turn aside the way of knowledge,
but led to the tragedy: he became the involuntary murderer of Gretchen, her
child, mother and brother Valentine.
In the first part of the book, Faust was at least capable to an
emotional experience apropos of all that happened, but in the second part, we
see already a quite heartless and faceless person.
Thanks to Mephistopheles, he has great practical resources, but how does
he use them? The sample is his “love affair” with the ghost of Helen. The ghost
soon disappears, but Faust feels no emotions over that.
The city on the drained region of the sea, which Faust decided to build,
is absolutely ephemeral and necessary for nobody. Old blind Faust walks along a
seashore and thinks that a beautiful city is being raised around him, but
there, in fact, little demons are digging the grave for him.
Let us note that Goethe intuitively solved in his book the “fundamental
paradox of Christianity” – God took Faust’s soul into heaven, having forgiven
him both the treaty with Mephistopheles and many deaths through his fault.
But nevertheless let us establish the fact: after the treaty with the
devil, neither activities nor knowledge of Faust had any aims or results. To
put it more precisely, there were results, but they did not bring anything
except evil to people.
The devil is evil by definition, consequently,
all his acts may be only evil for a human and for the humanity.
III
And in the pragmatic 20th century, the treaty between Faust and
Mephistopheles got one more aspect, not so harmless as
flights to witches’ sabbaths. I mean people, who
choose the ways of the struggle for the things, which they consider as good, by
the means of evil, – I mean international terrorists. Today they capture planes
and direct them to skyscrapers, tomorrow they will
capture nuclear bombs.
And it is quite reasonable to ask: do we, who live in the beginning of
the third millennium, have a right to sign the treaty with the devil, if it may
lead to the death of the population of the Earth?
Dualism says that we have that right. The point is that if the devil is
actually equivalent to God, a logical conclusion arises: why is he worse than
God is? Accordingly, why is evil worse than good?
And that inevitably leads to the following: evil is no evil, but it is
some special form of good. Not to kill – that is good, and to kill – that is
also good. This is the moral imperative, and that is the moral imperative.
But if there are two imperatives (or even more,
as in the case of Polytheism), there is no moral imperative, but there is a continuous
moral choice between equally valid and, as a rule, conflicting variants.
And that situation is evil by itself. There is the single moral
imperative and single God.
The latter conclusion may seem disputable. It turns out that Monotheism,
as against Dualism, limits free will and replaces it by the moral imperative
– i.e. by something like a command to think in some way and act in some way.
Possibly, the idea of the limiting of free will by the moral imperative
could be formed in readers’ mind even before, and it is necessary to speak
separately about that.
IV
It is often considered (especially amidst humanitarian intellectuals)
that the presence of a strict moral basis (i.e. non-freedom of our will from
the moral imperative) guarantees the unlimited, “true” freedom of will in all
other aspects, including social and physiological ones.
Then a question appears: what to do with the prohibition to cross a
street at the red light. It is answered that such prohibitions do not limit our
“true freedom”, because within the limits of road laws we have some other kind
of freedom – especially for roads. Prisoners also have their “freedom”, which
is limited by the walls of their prison. But all these “local” contexts of
freedom do not touch upon the “global” one, which is limited only by the moral
imperative.
A number of examples are cited, and, possibly, the most striking one –
Boethius, who, being in the prison and waiting for the execution, wrote his
epochal work “Consolation of Philosophy”. It turns out that Boethius was free
as a philosopher, but not free as a citizen.
In principle, that point of view is quite logical and consistent. But I
am rather bothered by this “double-dealing” of the freedom of will. Then an
irresistible barrier is built between the “special sphere” – morality – and
other spheres of life, and the moral imperative obtains a transcendent
character and ceases to be understandable to all.
And in this case in the contemporary world, which is far from
perfection, as we have already cleared up, every humanist turns out to be
surrounded by “Sodom people”, free from demands of the moral imperative.
Let us note that Boethius was executed as a result, and that is a
tragedy regardless the fact that the philosopher had a “true” free will at the
moment when the executioner’s sword touched his neck. And that tragedy does not
become less even if we say that the executioner’s free will was not “true”.
Some time ago, such a situation induced us to
turn from the moral imperative to religion, i.e. from philosophy to theology.
And now because of the same reasons we have the right to postulate: there must
be no “double-dealing” of freedom – one freedom for Boethius, another for “
But then what is this – freedom?
Philosophic manuals, guides and encyclopedias mostly often determine
freedom as the activities and behavior in conditions of the absence of an
external target designation.
It is in theory, but there are no conditions of the absence of an
external target designation in practice. Every activity, every behavior is
conditioned by a number of external factors (from innate to accidental ones),
which are the target designation in fact.
For example, King Solomon decided (i.e. made the choice) to build the
House of the Lord (1 Kin. 6:1), also basing on many factors. It is doubtless
that he took into consideration the economical and political situation, and
this is the typical external target designation. But at that, it is difficult
to deny that Solomon was free in his choice and, having analyzed all factors,
knowingly decided to spend money to the Temple and not to put up those sums to
the construction of new walls of Ierusalem.
This sample and many other possible ones reduce the demand of the
absence of an external target designation to the logical absurdity: only the
random choice is freedom. It turns out that if Solomon had not thought about
building the
But we are speaking about the freedom of will, and in the foresaid case,
there is no volitional act. In the logical limit, only some abstract
freedom can be reduced to the random choice, and the freedom of will
presumes the realized choice.
The elements of the random choice, of course, can not be excluded.
Firstly, King Solomon could have thrown lots to decide if to build the
There is another extreme: the Determinists, including Marx, understood
freedom as a realized necessity. But in actual fact, that position replaced the
choice of an act (of a conclusion, of an intention) by the act itself. It is a
typically speculative point of view, because the necessity of the realized
(i.e. irrevocably accepted) act does not mean the necessity of the act itself.
It may be chosen, and may be not chosen.
And if freedom is not a random choice and is not a realized necessity,
then the “intermediate” variant remains: freedom is a possibility of a realized
choice, which takes into consideration both necessity and chance.
The freedom is fulfilled just in the realized choice, in accordance with
the essence and level of the chosen (rejected) variants. The possibility of the
realization of such choice on the level of human will means the freedom of
will.
We have done the reservation “in accordance with the essence and the
level” not accidentally. Without it, we shall not be able to solve the
following paradox: a man is in a prison, consequently,
he is not free. But he has a possibility to choose a solitary or common cell,
consequently, he is free. He can not go out of the prison,
consequently, he is not free. But he can walk to any side of his cell,
consequently, he is free. And so on.
The similar sample we have already examined, speaking about Boethius.
And it is impossible to take away the freedom of thought and imagination from
any prisoner.
Thus, every situation has a number of different aspects and
“sub-situations”, and that fragmentation is infinite. Let us call that as situational
levels and say: the freedom of will as a realized choice of variants may be
fulfilled (or not fulfilled) simultaneously at different situational levels.
A “life” sample: a choice of a suit is conditioned on the material
prosperity and plans for the day, and a choice of a cravat – by the choice of
the suit. At both levels, different (and differently free) acts of choice are
done, but both of them realize the freedom of will.
Our determination of freedom as a realized choice is right even for
acts, which concern only our consciousness, such as thought and imagination.
We, thinking and imagining, also choose of a number of variants, at that
consciously by definition, since it belongs exclusively to the sphere of our
consciousness. But the possibilities of our thought and even of our imagination
are not infinite (they are limited by age, education, life experience and a
number of other factors), that is why it is possible to consider them as the
situational levels, where there are more variants of choice in comparison with
the ordinary life.
And then everything takes place as in our sample with the suit and the
cravat: a choice at the situational level “Imagination” conditions (but does
not dictate) a choice at the situational level “Thought”, further this line may
be prolonged through the level “Decision” to the level “Action”, at that, each
level has the infinite number of “sublevels”.
Basing on all said about freedom, we have no reason to consider that at
the highest situational level – the moral – a human is deprived of the
freedom of will as of the possibility of a realized choice.
The
moral imperative is a demand, but not a compulsion. In nowadays’ society there
is a great number of factors, both objective and subjective, owing to which
even people of the highest morality sometimes act contrary to the moral
imperative.
This is the freedom of the realized moral choice – between good and
evil. This freedom may not be called more or less limited than its most strict
understanding at other situational levels.
V
Now we can return to Dualism, which practically equalizes good and evil
(i.e. evil and the moral imperative). As a result, it does not lead to the
choice between good and evil, but it leads to the choice between two “goods”,
which contradict to each other.
To show the groundlessness of the Dualistic point of view, let us
remember once more our determination of the freedom of will, which is valid for
all situational levels, even to the extent, what road to choose, walking along
a park: the true freedom of will is the possibility of a realized choice, which
is conditioned by a situation and by its level.
If we speak about the highest, moral level, the true freedom is
the freedom to choose good and evil consciously, appreciating positive and
negative sequences of the choice to the extent of personal abilities.
And Dualism leads to the false freedom – to a choice between two
contradictory “goods”. The false freedom means the deprivation of the
possibility to choose the true good freely and consciously, practically
replacing the freedom of the realized choice by a coincidence.
However, not only a coincidence, but also a self-deception or a “split
personality” is possible, at that, the latter, in its extreme expression, is in
the competence of psychiatrists. A person must not split, and this is a pledge
of our psychological comfort and normal feeling.
“Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and
every city or house divided against itself shall not stand” (Matt. 12:25).
As usually, there are a number of intermediate variants – as there are a
number of gradations of black and white color. But so, as at the determination
of some gradation of gray color it is necessary to understand what black and
white colors are, it is necessary to be consciously orientated to good
at any moral choice and not to be occupied with a self-deception.
So, for a specific person the unity is good, and the split is evil. The
true freedom, which is given by the moral imperative, does not violate the
unity of person. The false (Dualistic) one violates.
Now, discussing the problem what the freedom of a specific person may
bring to people, we may postulate its important humanistic aspect: in
principle, a human may choose not only good, but also evil. But in the
conditions of the action of the moral imperative, the probability of evil as of
a realized choice is reduced.
In
other words, if a criminal knows that he commits a crime, there is a chance
that at some moment the moral imperative keeps him from that crime. But if a
criminal, murdering and robbing, considers that he commits good (and that takes
place in the case of accepting Dualism), – there is no such chance, and the
probability of committing a crime rises many times.
That is why the Dualistic point of view incompatibly contradicts to the
moral imperative, and we have to refuse of it.
Everything said about Dualism completely concerns Polytheism: then
in the moral aspect it turns out that it does not matter to whom to serve – to
Apollo, or to Ares, or to Athena, or to Aphrodite, or to Dionysus, or to
Hermes. All of them are equal children of morally indifferent Zeus.
Thus, only Monotheism remains. Strict Christian
Monotheism. But then we have to go on with the solution of the problem
of the Theodicy.
VI
Let us examine the author of the term “Theodicy” Leibniz’s position,
which is supported by the modern theology of major
Leibniz considered quite reasonably that God was free to create or not
to create our world. But God, by definition, always does the best,
consequently, he created our world as the best of all the possible worlds.
And why there are evil and suffering in the world, Leibniz also tried to
explain: nothing in the world may be equal in perfection to God, thus, a quite
admissible non-perfection of the world leads to the suffering of individuals.
But since everything in the world is submitted to an aim, for which it was
created, then our suffering is also necessary for some great general
aim, which is known only for God.
A similar position is taken by the official Orthodox theology. In the
“Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs about faith” it is said: “We believe that
all the existing, visible and invisible, is led by the Divine Providence;
however, evil, as evil, God only foresees and is tolerant to it, but does not
provide it, because he did not create it. And evil, which has already happened,
is directed to something useful by Holy goodness, which does not commit evil
itself, but directs it to good as it is possible”.
We see that concept of the “Divine Providence” of the major Churches has
the exact parallel with Leibniz’s “submission of the world to some great
general aim, which known only for God”, and Churches’ “foreseen evil to which
God is tolerant” – with Leibniz’s “admissible non-perfection of the world”.
All that seems to be logical, and this position seems to be grounded
philosophically and theologically. It was possible to reveal its groundlessness
intuitively not for a philosopher or a theologian, but for the writer – Fyodor
Dostoyevsky. In the novel “The Brothers Karamazov” (translated by Constance
Garnett) one of the brothers Karamazov, Ivan, tells his brother Alyosha:
“This poor child of five was subjected to every possible torture by
those cultivated parents. They beat her, thrashed her, kicked
her for no reason till her body was one bruise. Then, they went to greater
refinements of cruelty – shut her up all night in the cold and frost in a
privy, and because she didn’t ask to be taken up at night (as though a child of
five sleeping its angelic, sound sleep could be trained to wake and ask), they
smeared her face and filled her mouth with excrement, and it was her mother,
her mother did this. And that mother could sleep, hearing the poor child’s
groans! Can you understand why a little creature, who can’t even understand
what’s done to her, should beat her little aching heart with her tiny fist in
the dark and the cold, and weep her meek unresentful
tears to dear, kind God to protect her? Do you understand that, friend and
brother, you pious and humble novice? Do you understand why this infamy must be
and is permitted? Without it, I am told, man could not have existed on earth,
for he could not have known good and evil. Why should he know that diabolical
good and evil when it costs so much? Why, the whole world of knowledge is not
worth that child’s prayer to “dear, kind God”! I say nothing to the sufferings
of grown-up people, they have eaten the apple, damn them, and the devil take
them all! But these little ones!..”
Further Ivan says: “...I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It’s
not worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast
with his little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated tears to “dear, kind God”! It’s not worth it,
because those tears are unatoned for. They must be
atoned for, or there can be no harmony. But how? How
are you going to atone for them? Is it possible? By their being avenged? But
what do I care for avenging them? What do I care for a hell for oppressors?
What good can hell do, since those children have already been tortured? And
what becomes of harmony, if there is hell? I want to forgive. I want to
embrace. I don’t want more suffering.”
And then Ivan applies to Alyosha: “Tell me
yourself, I challenge you – answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of
human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace
and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death
only one tiny creature – that baby beating its breast with its fist, for
instance – and to found that edifice on its unavenged
tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?..”
As we see, in emotional aspect Ivan was quite able to bring God to a
trial and put him in a dock together with the parents-sadists. And even without
any emotions, it turns out that on every dock God is sitting near every
murderer, robber and violator. God, who does not only allow, but even provides
all the crimes.
And does that “
VII
To understand, where this contradiction is from, let us ask ourselves
the question: how did Ivan Karamazov perceive God?
We shall see in the nearest future that by the efforts of the medieval
Churches the concepts of God, Christ and a King mixed into one thing. And now
let us simply think: if we often perceive even Jesus, our Savior who expiated
our sins, as a pitiless retributive sovereign, then
what to say about God?
God turned into the absolute dictator of our thoughts and acts, and the
theologians of the major Churches (as well as Leibniz) tried to solve the
problem of the Theodicy, basing on the “Divine Providence”.
And since God “only foresees evil and is tolerant to it, but does not
provide it”, the solution was internally contradictory: either God is not
absolutely almighty, or he is tolerant to evil consciously, being its direct or
indirect culprit.
Nevertheless, Ivan Karamazov also formulated his angry rebuff, basing on
the same prerequisite of the absolute dictatorship of God, and he did it really
logically: a dictator does not only dictate to citizens how to act, but also
has a certain responsibility to them. However, as every
absolute ruler.
Let us draw an analogy: while Stalin and Hitler were alive, they were
considered as the inspirers and organizers of all the victories, and when they
died, they turned out to be the culprits of everything. Even of that, which
culprits they were not.
Of course, it is inadmissible to compare God with bloody dictators, but,
in accordance with the logic of the theologians of the major Churches, that is
so. There is some hypothetic bright future, only the all-knowing and all-seeing
leader knows the way to it, and for the sake of this bright future, it is
necessary to make some human (or even children’s) sacrifices.
And in fact, the question of the Theodicy is replaced by the question:
to what limits is it possible to use the “human material” of the building of
this enigmatic future?
Stalin and Hitler murdered millions of people and exceeded limits. God
was tolerant to the persecutions of the little children and exceeded limits.
And if to murder no millions, but “only” hundreds thousand people, and to be
tolerant only to the suffering of children of no less than seven years old – is
it the exceeding of limits? Or, may be, not?
Let us approach from another side. Ivan Karamazov asked his brother the
question, if he would have accepted the “
Alyosha said, –
“No”, and was absolutely right.
Bit in our time, many pragmatically minded people would have a wish to
say, – “Yes”. Really, only one child will be tortured, and the whole humanity,
billions of people, will be happy!
Unfortunately, then a following reasonable question arises: if it is
necessary to torture to death two children? Is it also possible? Yes?
Then let us ask the analogous questions further. If it
is necessary to torture three children? Is it also possible? And four? And twenty? And fifty? And five hundred? And one thousand? And one million? And a hundred millions, at that not only the children?
Where are that limits, do they exist and is it possible to calculate
them?
Someone will understand at the second question, for someone five or ten
“approaches” will be necessary to understand: no and once more no. People are
not a material and not a mechanism, and we are not calculating the maximum of the
permissible load of automobile shock-absorbers.
The main achievement of Christianity (as of the contemporary humanism)
is that the life of any human is sacred and inviolable. Otherwise, we
shall hold the arithmetic disputes, and maniacs will go on murdering children,
because we have one arithmetic, and maniacs – another one.
That were our initial positions, and we have obtained an additional
confirmation for them.
VIII
So, is God an almighty dictator?
Let us formulate this question more comprehensively. Though we have
spoken about the freedom of will as about the possibility of a realized choice,
we have not touched upon an important question: do we have a possibility of any
choice at all? Doesn’t the almighty dictator – God – make the choices for us at
the innumerable situational levels?
No, God does not make the choices, and it is possible to prove it by the
“rule of contraries”.
Let us imagine that a human does not have the freedom of will, our
freedom is false and God, directly or indirectly, acts instead of us.
Then a human inevitably becomes the “human material” of some higher
mechanism – God, the history, the society or others. And a material can
not be sacred, and any politician (and any maniac) would have been able to
murder any number of people.
We have come to the contradiction with the moral imperative, which
demands the inviolability of the human life. Consequently, a human has the true
freedom of will, which was to be proved.
So, every human has the freedom of will, which is limited at a number of
situational levels by the moral imperative, by “local” morals of different
social groups, by state laws, by material prosperity and an infinite quantity
of other factors.
And that excludes God’s culpability of sins, crimes and improper acts,
which are committed by people freely – when the choice between good and
evil is made in favor of evil.
Let us call that freely chosen evil by “social” – evil, which depends
exclusively on people.
For justice let us note that both the Orthodox and
But we have managed to solve that question without contradiction, though
for the sake of that we had to refuse of the perception of God as of an
almighty dictator. Practically, of the Churches’ concept of
the “Divine Providence”.
Nevertheless, we should not cast doubt on the omnipotence of God.
It is possible to rule the world without either a direct interference or a
small-minded regulation, but by means of laws of nature and laws of morality.
We shall have a possibility to discuss it in the last chapter of our book.
But we have succeeded in the solution of the problem of the Theodicy. However, for the time being only partially – in the sphere of
social relations. A number of situations remain, when a human suffers
directly of nature:
– Firstly, hurricanes, tsunami and floods – the irresistible forces of
nature, i.e. “force majeur” (often even named “acts
of God”);
– Secondly, internal diseases, which are non-conditioned socially
(cancer, infarct and many others);
– Thirdly, accidents (to get frozen, to get burned, to stumble and fall,
to get lost etc.)
Let us name that evil “natural” and say that we are not yet ready to
analyze it, and shall be ready not soon. We have not yet understood the essence
and the reasons of “social” evil, and without that, it is impossible to
approach to a much more complicated understanding of “natural” evil.
And “social” evil is committed to a variable degree by each of us. “As
it is written, There is no righteous, no, not one” (Rom. 3:10). That is why it
is necessary to understand where “social” evil is from and how to struggle
against it.
IX
Theologians, who work for major Churches, refer to so called “original
sin”. The disobeying of Adam and Eve (Gen. 3:6) is raised to the rank of the
“falling away from God”, and our freedom of will (realized in that act of
disobeying) is declared to lead exclusively to evil. However, righteous people
have a chance to reunite with God, and sinners, of course, do not have.
Well, let us look from the classic theological positions at the freedom
of will, which appeared for the first time at our ancestors Adam and Eve, and
ask the question: is it possible that just the free will led to evil in their
innumerable posterity?
Of course, if the alternative “to obey – to disobey” appeared,
then there was the freedom of will, i.e. the freedom of a realized choice. They
could obey, they could disobey...
Yes, they disobeyed, but the disobeying is not yet evil in itself.
Possibly, it is a sin, but there are different sins.
We shall have another possibility to discuss, what to consider as sin
and what not to consider, and for the time being let us establish that Adam’s
disobeying did not bring any evil to anybody – of course, if we base only on
Biblical texts and invent nothing.
For example, there was no direct connection between the disobeying of
Adam and the first indisputable sin, Cain’s crime (Gen. 4:8). Cain
committed evil of his own free will, and the reason of his crime was
exclusively the envy at Abel (Gen. 4:4-7).
And even an indirect connection – so to speak, if Adam and Eve had not
been sent from the Garden of Eden (Gen. 3:23), they would not have given birth
to Cain who committed evil – also does not stand criticism. The point is that
if Adam and Eve had not given birth to someone, there would not have been the
humanity as a whole. And the explication that Cain was probably badly brought
up by his parents is nothing more than a fantasy.
Consequently, the disobeying of Adam and Eve may not be a convincing
cause of considering our freedom as the “falling away from God”, the putting of
us on a par with the Satan (“the fallen Angel”), and the understanding of a
human as a “loathsome vessel of sin”.
Moreover, God allowed that disobeying, possibly even “provoked” it.
We shall not refer to the well-known joke: God could have forbidden to
Adam and Eva more severely, and, knowing their curious nature, could have
somehow enclosed the tree of good and evil...
Without any joke, the “original sin” was knowingly allowed by
God. Let us prove that.
God forbid to eat fruits of the tree of good
and evil on pain of death (Gen. 2:17), but after the disobeying, he punished so
terribly neither Adam nor Eva. Moreover, he even did not curse them personally,
but quite peacefully sent them “forth from the garden of Eden, to till the
ground from whence he was taken” (Gen. 3:23). It is significant that the book
of the generations of Adam begins not from a damnation
but from the blessing (Gen. 5:2).
Taking into consideration the fact that God, according to the Old
Testament, very soon arranged the Flood for humanity and spared only righteous
Noah (Gen. 6:7), such a “gentleness” with respect to Adam and Eve means that
their disobeying was forethought and knowingly allowed by God.
Furthermore, I am inclined to consider that there was something like a
“trial by freedom” for Adam and Eve, and our ancestors, having managed to
disobey, stood that trial. And they became ready to inhabit the Earth only
after that.
It is necessary to note that it is most probable that Christ did not
acknowledge the “original sin”. Let us remember:
“And as Jesus passed by, he saw a man which was blind from his birth.
And his disciples asked him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or his
parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered, Neither
hath this man sinned, nor his parents: but that the works of God should be made
manifest in him” (John 9:1-3).
Speaking about the “original sin”, the theologians of the major Churches
usually refer to the words of Apostle Paul: “Wherefore, as by one man sin
entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for
that all have sinned” (Rom. 5:12).
And though Paul cited that only as an example, not aiming at a serious
analysis of Adam’s sin (by the way, at that having forgotten about Eve),
nevertheless, let us try to understand, what the Apostle had in view, saying
that “death passed upon all men”.
The most modern version of theology of the major Churches says that God
threatened Adam with a spiritual death (not a physical one), and Adam after his
disobeying died in spirit.
But in actual fact, it is most probable that Adam after his disobeying
obtained divinity (“And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of
us, to know good and evil” – Gen. 3:22). It is possible to interpret God’s
words “Is become as one of us” in different ways, and we shall have possibility
to give a consideration to them. But the matter does not concern a spiritual
death, which is incompatible with divinity, independently of a way of its
interpretation.
Another “stereotype” opinion, which was hold by Aurelius Augustine and
John Chrysostom: Adam was immortal physically before
the “original sin”, and after that ceased to be immortal.
But, firstly, God grant everyone to live as long as Adam (930 years –
Gen. 5:5), and the main thing is that Adam was not physically immortal
also before his disobeying – otherwise God would not have bewared of that “lest
he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for
ever” (Gen. 3:22).
But if Adam’s disobeying led neither to a spiritual death, nor to a
physical one, then what did Paul have in view?
For that it is necessary to understand, what life, as against Adam,
Christ brought to us. Let us read the Epistle to Romans further: “That as sin
hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto
eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord” (Rom. 5:21).
From this quotation and the context of Paul’s teaching it follows that
there was considered no physical or spiritual death, but the death without a
hope for resurrection and future happiness. We shall speak in a special chapter
about these basic concepts of Christianity – they are greatly important for
each of us.
And as regards the “original sin”, we have understood that we must thank
Adam and Eve, and must not curse them. They took upon themselves the great
burden of the knowledge of good and evil (actually became the first bearers of
the moral imperative) and made the way for us.
And if we consider that the disobeying of Adam and Eve brought the
humanity to evil, then God, having allowed that disobeying knowingly, allowed
evil also knowingly, and that contradicts to our solution of the problem of the
Theodicy.
Consequently, humanity was brought to evil by no “original sin”.
X
The humanity came to evil (I remind that we are speaking about “social”
evil, which, freely or not freely, is committed by each of us) in quite another
way, and to understand it we have to remember one more well-known episode of
the Bible – one of temptations of Christ.
It is the third temptation in Matthew’s Gospel, the second one in
Luke’s.
“The devil taketh him up into an exceeding
high mountain, and sheweth him all the kingdoms of
the world, and the glory of them; and saith unto him,
All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me”
(Matt. 4:8-9).
“And the devil said unto him, “All this power will I give thee, and the
glory of them: for that is delivered unto me; and to whomsoever I will I give
it” (Luke 4:6-7).
It was really tempting – to take, to rule, to spread good, to struggle
against evil and build the Kingdom of God in every country, city and village.
But Christ refused reasonably, – “Thou shalt worship
the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve”
(Matt. 4:10).
However, if there even had not been no
temptation, Jesus did not speak about any way of taking of a state power and of
a forced bringing of people to good and love. There was nothing like that in
the Gospels, and could not be.
There were a number of the Old Testament’s prophecies about the coming
of Messiah, but Jesus mostly followed to Isaiah’s one:
“Who hath believed our report? And to whom is the arm of the Lord
revealed?
For he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of
a dry ground: he hath no form nor comiless;
and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him.
He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted
with grief: and we hid as it as it were our faces from him; he was despised,
and we esteemed him not.
Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried
our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted.
But he has wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our
iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we
are healed.
All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own
way; and the Lord hath laid on him the inquidity of
us all.
He was oppressed, and he was afficted, yet he
opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep
before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his
mouth.
He was taken from prison and from judgement:
and who shall declare his generation? for he was cut
off out of the land of living: for the transgression of my people was he stricken.
And he made his grave with the wicked, and with
the rich in his death; because he had done no violence, neither was any deceit
in his mouth.
Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when
thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he
shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord
shall prosper in his hand” (Is. 53:1-10).
And if Jesus followed the way, which was foretold by Isaiah, and did not
take a state power and punish evil with a help of the police and army – why are
we waiting together with Ivan Karamazov that a lightning comes from the sky and
burns to ashes the torturers of the little child?
In all probability, Christ understood (and let us also understand) that while torturers still wish to be
torturers, it is impossible to frighten them either by lightnings
and hell or by prisons and executions. That was earnestly shown by the burning
of
XI
And to understand why evil is committed around us, and moreover, why
each of us has some temptation to commit it, let us ask a counter-question,
which relates to the examined temptation of Christ:
-What right did the devil have to offer all the earthly kingdoms
to Jesus?
Of course, in theory an attempt of deception was possible from the
direction of the devil.
But firstly, Jesus was the Messiah and the Son of God, so it is too
unlikely that the devil offered something to him, having no real right to do
it.
And secondly (and that is most important), in that case the temptation
would not have been a temptation. The point is that the devil had the full
authority to offer all the earthly kingdoms to Jesus, but Christ managed to
refuse of them. If there had been a deception, there would have been nothing to
refuse of.
Then who is the devil?
It turns out that he is somebody like the supreme ruler of the earthly
kingdoms (we shall use the contemporary term – the states). Christ called him
as the “prince of this world” (John 14:30).
And to avoid the idea of the devil as of a Mephistopheles-like
gentleman, who commits evil by hands of presidents, ministers, oligarchs,
generals and other “great ones of this world”, let us turn to the understanding
of the fundamental nature of the devil: that are the states themselves.
At first sight, it seems to be paradoxical, but there are no other
adequate variants of the interpretation of the devil’s words about the
kingdoms, which are delivered to him (Luke 4:6). And it seems paradoxical only
at first sight.
Let us remember “visiting cards” of any state – social injustice, oppression,
money, political intrigues, armies, police, corruption, bureaucracy, wars...
And what can the tears of one innocent child mean for states, if
millions of people die for the moving of state borders for some kilometers! The
deaths of soldiers, at least, remain in military reports and headquarters’
calculations, but nobody counts the deaths of thousands of children. And even
if these deaths are counted, then only since a child will sooner or later grow
up, take a gun and go to kill...
Does all that serve for God?
Of course, it does not, even if that is a crusade or a “jihad”! Those
are cases, when for some “noble” aim it is necessary to murder a number of
innocent people and to build on their blood something ephemeral. As we know,
empires do not live long. At any case, none of them managed to live for two
thousand years – as many as Christianity has already lived and, thank God, is
not going to die.
And money – a mighty instrument of the state
power? How much blood is shed for them? What aren’t people
ready to give up for it? Whom aren’t they ready to
betray?
Let us not condemn once more the imperfection of earthly states. Each of
us felt it on his own back many times.
The question is as follows: is that imperfection objective, and can it become a perfection somewhere and some time, not losing the
contemporary economical and political features of a state at that? Is an
absolutely fair, just, decent and humane state possible? At
least theoretically?
Someone may say that it is possible. Let us remember Thomas More’s “Utopia”, the theory of Marx and Engels, its
remaking by Lenin and Stalin, the “Theocracy” of Vladimir Solovyov...
XII
And to show that, in actual fact, such a state is impossible,
we have to approach on the other hand. As in the case with Ivan Karamazov,
literature will help us. Particularly, one episode of Jack
London’s “White Fang”.
As we remember, in the beginning of the “adult” edition of that book a
wolf pack pursues two travelers. One of those travelers is soon eaten up, and
the second one struggles desperately. And when he can hardly bear to fight and
the wolves come quite closely, he notices, much to his surprise, that there is
neither rage nor bared teeth on their muzzles. They looked like children, who
gathered near the table and were waiting only for the permission to start
eating with delight.
It could have been a quite idyllic picture – of course, if not to take
into consideration that the wolves were going to satisfy their hunger by him,
as he had usually satisfied his hunger by the meat of elks and hares.
Such “interrelations”.
Who can say that there is no honesty, decency, justice, naturalness and even
“humanity” in them? If the wolves do not eat the traveler, won’t they die of
hunger? Or won’t their cubs die? What is more “humanely” from the wolf’s point
of view – to nag the traveler (a stranger) or to let a cub (the own) die? Where
is evil here?
There is evil here, furthermore a very serious one, though it is not
seen at first glance. The point is that the problem of good and evil is solved
in a wolf pack by its complete exclusion of examination – a wolf pack knows
nothing about good and evil, and that is why it behaves quite naturally and
even attractively in its own way.
Two natural “basic instincts” are brilliantly simple – a species’
preservation and continuation. Sometimes the third is mentioned –
interrelations with similar ones, but in actual fact, it is a consequence of
the first two instincts. It is easier to hunt in a pack, it is easier to defend
in a herd, and a partner is also necessary for the species’ continuation.
Every wolf instinctively knows since his birth: bite and tear everyone
whom you see out of the pack (desirably more weak ones), and in the pack – obey
the hierarchy and don’t fight against higher ones without the full confidence
in your victory, otherwise you will be bit and teared
yourself. And don’t forget that you need strength and health to “reproduce” one
fine day.
All that seems to be good, but the projecting of the wolf pack model to
habitual forms of the human social organization (a kin, a tribe, national and
state structures), things do not turn out to be not so smooth.
If we use samples from literature so widely (exclusively owing to their
obviousness), let us remember Rudyard Kipling’s tales of “The Jungle Books” –
the typical case of giving a “human face” to the honesty and decency of
animals.
There is a characteristic paradox in that tales. Do you remember how the
“lovely” predators wished a “lucky hunting” to each other? We read that tales
in the childhood and did not think, for whom that hunting was. And now let us
think – isn’t it for us? At the minimum, for deers or
hares – but in Kipling’s tales they are also animated, we also feel pity for
them...
Have you noticed that the moral imperative has “switched on”, and it has
turned out that not everything is so remarkable in a wolf pack? And not only in the relations with other animals, but also inside
the pack. Do you remember the sacral phrase “Akela
has missed”? And, actually, from wolves’ point of view that is an enough cause
to nag the leader and put on his place a new one...
So we see that a wolf pack is a useful and even necessary community,
which provides the preservation and continuation of the species according to
the “natural selection”, but no peace and happiness of each wolf, and moreover
of other animals – the potential victims.
“If ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed
one of another” (Gal. 5:15). It is most likely that Paul did not use the words
“bite” and “devour” accidentally.
XIII
So why did Christ refuse to rule over the earthly states? Didn’t he
understand that every state, which is based on the tears of the innocent
children, is at best a modified model of a wolf pack?
Yes, that is indeed the case, and that is confirmed by the fact that
Christ considered the ruling over states as serving not to God, but to the
devil (Matt. 4:10; John 14:30).
That is why I propose to speak about good and evil in the human society
only in the context of the relationship of the moral imperative (humanistic,
Christian spiritual principles) with the “basic natural instincts”. Now we have
come to it by the theological way, but we shall have a possibility to examine
this problem also in philosophic aspect in the last chapter.
For the time being let us remember Jesus’
words: “It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing” (John 6:63).
And the words of Apostle Paul:
“This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the
flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so ye cannot do the things
that ye would...
Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; Adultery,
fornication, unclearness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred,
variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings,
murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of
the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they
which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.
But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering,
gentleness, goodness, faith” (Gal. 5:16-22).
Thus, by the New Testament, our spirit lives according to one law, and
our flesh – by another.
Because of limited scientific knowledge of Paul’s time, the Apostle
could not say in one phrase, according to which specific law our flesh lives,
and enumerated: adultery, fornication, unclearness, lasciviousness, idolatry,
witchcraft...
But we, having provided ourselves with modern scientific achievements,
may specify: our flesh lives in accordance with the “basic instincts”, which we
have “inherited” of our biological ancestors, i.e. of apes. And if to
speak in the social context, then rather of wolves, because apes in natural
conditions of jungle do not occupy the highest stage (many predators hunt for
them).
And the identifying of any king or president (even the most clever and
talented) with a guide to “Divine good” is the same mistake as the giving to
the predator Akela the same features by Kipling.
Moreover, “remarkable” Akela will sooner or later
miss, and who will then replace him? God knows.
Thus, any statement of a possibility of either a “good” wolf pack or an
“ideal” state is only an attempt of giving a wishful out for the real.
Nowadays’ states have to “flirt” with citizens, to organize election
campaigns, to advertise politicians etc. But even now in the most democratic
state, a human is a screw in a huge mechanism. Absolutely calmly and easily
these screws are oiled when it is necessary, or thrown away when it is
necessary.
The
development of civilization softens extremes like “no murder – no meal”, but
there are wars and executions...
That is the objective essence of a state – the subordination of human
interests to society interests. The person’s priority above society is declared
in the constitutions of the majority of developed countries, but it is rather
propaganda than reflection of the real situation.
Every state lives according to the laws of a wolf pack
and, consequently, is not good, but evil.
CHAPTER V: CAESAR’S – TO CAESAR
Sergey Zagraevsky
© 2004
CHAPTER I: THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
CHAPTER III: GOOD AND THE “FUNDAMENTAL PARADOX OF
CHRISTIANITY”
CHAPTER IV: EVIL AND THE THEODICY
CHAPTER V: CAESAR’S – TO CAESAR
CHAPTER VIII: CHRISTIANITY AND THE PRESENT
CHAPTER X: THE “IMMACULATE CONCEPTION”